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Abstract
How is it possible to perform more than is required? And yet, isn’t that precisely what is required, in 
order for an interlocking society of human beings to function, develop and evolve? If human beings only 
did what we were told to do, we would live in complete monotony and enslavement. If human beings 
did only what we were permitted to do, nothing interesting would ever happen. Although performance 
has often been limited to the study of isolated artistic forms of expressions (music, visual arts, etc.), it is 
equally possible to analyze culture, on the whole, as a behaviour-encoding system of rules and regulations, 
wherein the individual actor’s performative appropriation and reinterpretation of these said (cultural, 
political, artistic) rules makes possible the culture’s very survival, against all odds and obstacles, over long 
periods of time, as a “tradition” upheld by a community of rule-followers / rule-breakers. Rules, in a very 
real sense, are meant to be broken. Rule-breaking, by the same token, is, as it were, legislated within the 
very law code itself, as its own guarantee of immortality. After all, what law could function for any period 
of time without undergoing reinterpretation? This is good news both for culture and for the avant garde 
(the creative individual or collective), because even the strictest of rules creates its own conditions of 
transgression, and vice versa. The performance of culture through the creative freedom of the transgressive 
individual – i.e. any individual qua his or her individuality – is the sine qua non for a democratic society 
of peers. Creativity depends upon structure, and structure depends upon that which breaks its shackles 
of normativity, by rebirthing structure transgressively. The whole point of interpreters is to make things 
alright for the reappearance of the “father” (the law code) again. This is what Islamic reformism does. 
Ironically, then, anarchy is the only guarantee of the rule of law.
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1. CULTURE, TRADITION AND THE «FREE BONDAGE» OF MANKIND
When I’ll be speaking about culture, I mean any socially mediated praxis which carries mean-
ing and significance to people under its spell. In other words, culture is to the living present 
as tradition is to history: both terms refer to conditions of livelihood, a temporally extended 
living reality for people as individuals and as socially motivated agents. A tradition is a way 
of doing things, and the result of doing things is culture.
When people denigrate cultural affiliations as parochial, when people demand universal 
conditions of justice or law, they oftentimes see themselves as carrying on a project of libera-
tion. These enlightenment warriors want total liberation of the spirit from the enslavement 
of tradition. They demand to break the shackles of habit, culture and tradition, and open the 
doorway to a new world of cosmopolitan utopia. These people are progressivists, humanists, 
democrats, enlightenment rationalists etc...
On the other side, conservatives and neo-communitarians demand a return to or a protec-
tion of living history, and see the human being as eternally bound to actualizing its potentialities 
in a given social, historical and local tradition. Traditionalists and conservatives (or, as the case 
may be, utopian communalists) see the human being as a socially mediated flowering of spiritual 
and historical self-realization. They see the human being as an aimless wanderer in the dark 
night of history, destined to fail and falter without the guiding light of tradition which bestows 
upon the human spirit the powers and potencies of self-actualization as living members of an 
organic unity of a tradition with its internal logic of unfolding history. The tradition, whatever 
it may be, fosters a real sense of rootedness and belonging that binds a human being to a shared 
experience of lived historical tradition — be it nation, community, religion or shared praxis 
in the work place or the family — and simultaneously frees up the same human being into the 
active roles of engagement made possible only through this tradition. Every tradition is unique, 
with its own tastes, smells, colours and realities. An Italian peasant of the late middle ages, 
dressed in peculiar garment and engaged in peculiar social games, is far removed from the 
facts of life of a Berlin cabaret dancer of the 1920’s, and neither of these two «ways of doing 
things» is commensurable with the contemporary experiences of a suburban skater community 
in the outskirts of Los Angeles, California. Or, in another example, a Christian Saint lives the 
life of a Christian Saint and not the life of Beckettian fragmentary ego shattered in the face of 
bureaucracy, despite the universalizing tendencies of both Christian and Beckettian conceptions 
of what it means to be human. There are, of course, Beckettian Saints and, one might surmise, 
rather «saintly» Beckettians, but the singularity of a way of life can never be reduced to a weak 
analogy where a dominant term is used to explain the weaker. In other words, every reality 
is self-justifying (and justifiably so), every habit self-engendering (and self-evidently so) and 
every tradition complete in and of itself (set up within its own reality). We should not look for 
ways of X-izing Y, or Y-izing X (for example, Christianizing Beckett or vice versa). 
I hold the (empirical) ipseity and singularity of each and every thing, event and Dasein: 
no one thing is the same as any other, and no two cultures speak the same language, even 
when they do.
Traditions are unique not because they differ in facts, but because they differ 
holistically.
otto lehto
405
Every tradition, every culture, provides ways of finding meaning in this world. In other 
words, culture is, yes, bondage and obedience, but such that also paradoxically liberates the 
human being into practices of self-actualization (as member of a community), such prac-
tices without which the human being is a vast clamouring nothingness. This perennially 
Romantic sentiment has been best reflected in the writings of such philosophers of history as 
Vico, Collingwood, Spengler, Toynbee, Herder and, in our own time, Isaiah Berlin, Alasdair 
MacIntyre, John Ralston Saul and Charles Taylor, whose cyclical views of tradition, communi-
ties and history have served as a healthy counterbalance to the dominant discourse of unilater-
ally progressivist modernizing utopianism that traces its development through St. Augustine, 
Voltaire, Rousseau, Locke, Kant, Auguste Comte, Proudhon, Saint-Simon, Hegel and Marx, 
through the modern sociology of Durkheim and Weber, all the way to the contemporary neo-
Kantian and neo-Lockean purely formalistic political science, from John Rawls (1971) on 
the left to Robert Nozick (1975) on the right. The question is not, which tradition is right 
— Kantianism or communitarianism — but rather, how can we celebrate the beauty inherent 
in each perspective, and find a balance between (empty, formalistic) legal universalism and 
(rich, mystifying) aesthetic particularism? Currently, I am concerned with revitalizing Herder 
and Vico rather than defending Kant and Rawls, because it is clear where the dominant para-
digm of the day lies, and where the established dogmas are most transfixed under the present 
condition. Who reads Vico anymore? O tempora, o mores!
It would be wise, though, to read Vico and Herder, today more than ever, together with 
Nietzsche and MacIntyre, as champions of a kind of gorgeous historicism that liberates tradi-
tion from the bondages of the present. 
By this paradoxical statement, I mean that only by understanding history, and becoming 
part of it, can we liberate ourselves from the bondages of a life inherently bereft of meaning, 
and become absolutely free by means of a transcendental engagement with(in) a tradition as a 
Jacob’s Ladder to heaven.
We need to liberate the human mind from the naive illusion that the present is 
unconditioned.
We need to situate ourselves in a tradition, to become history, to make history, to act 
it out — in order to escape from it. There is only this: either be the conscious master or the 
unwitting dupe of history.
We need to recognize the shape and design of each unit of experience as an irreplaceable 
part, as Dewey, James and Peirce already pointed out, of a totalizing kind of way of doing 
things: a habit. Tradition is habit. The empirical truth of the singularity of experience means 
that each community, as a shared illusion of sorts, has maintained and perpetuated a particular 
stylistic commitment to a shared phenomenological-semiotic space-time reality made available 
only to members of that community, as Herder and Vico have pointed out. Every community 
or tradition, to the extent is has any lasting merit, embodies a new way of approaching human 
life by the means of shared signs and other cultural artefacts. The role of the historian is to 
delve into the mind space of a culture by means of a thoroughgoing self-transformative, almost 
visionary experience, trying to situate oneself as firmly as possible within the reality of the 
culture that one wants to understand; as Isaiah Berlin, echoing Herder, said, the scholar needs 
to understand «that one must not judge one culture by the criteria of another; that different 
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civilizations are different growths, pursue different goals, embody different ways of living, 
are dominated by different attitudes to life; so that to understand them one must perform an 
imaginative act of ‘empathy’ [Einfühlung] into their essence, understand them ‘from within’ 
as far as possible, and see the world through their eyes» (Berlin: 210). What Herder called 
«Einfühlung» Vico called «fantasia» (ibid: xix): the mental exercise of imaginative recrea-
tion with the intention of penetrating other cultures from within. Both Vico and Herder share 
with Nietzsche and Foucault «the cardinal truth that all valid explanation is necessarily and 
essentially genetic» (ibid: 34). A Deweyan analysis of the shapes and meanings of experi-
ence would be the appropriate parallel, and a Peircean combinatory analysis of «habit» and 
«tradition» would illuminate the contours of an interpretative tradition (such as Christian 
exegetics or neo-Romantic poetry) better than a simple historiological analysis of cultures 
and languages. But whatever the method used, the context remains the same: never to give 
up the singularity of the experience in favour of some retroactively justifed or ideologically 
coloured story about how things ought to have been as opposed to how things actually were, 
or seemed, in all their richness, through the prism and prison of the world view and culture 
we want to understand, deeply.
Communities, when freely entered into (and sometimes even when coercively placed 
upon your head), make the individual free to express him — or herself in ways unavailable 
to other communities and other traditions. A neo-expressionist is not a cubist is not a neo-
minimalist. In politics, a social demoratic paradise is not a liberatarian paradise. They both 
have their own charm and their own «mystical aura» of utopian vision. We need to choose 
our own traditions. Traditions are tools towards the liberation of humanity — the only tools 
that humanity can aspire to. Ways of doing things liberate: this is what Martha Nussbaum and 
Amartya Sen have emphasized in their «capability approach» to political agency; the power 
to act, through «positive freedoms» (as Isaiah Berlin called them) or «substantive freedoms» 
(as Amartya Sen called them) to achieve particular results in the real world. Cultures, I claim, 
following Aristotle and MacIntyre, provide precisely such «capabilities» (or «virtues») by the 
means of which humanity can inspire to goodness.
Of course communities are also shackles. But only toxically moribund (or just stupid 
and old) and schismatically universalizing traditions deny the validity of cultures and traditions 
other than themselves. The more enlightened defenders of cultural integrity are relativists and 
pluralists, like Isaiah Berlin or the aforementioned Johann Gottfried von Herder, who see the 
richness of different traditions as the justified richness of the flora and fauna of human bio-
sphere, as different expressions of the truly vast and infinite potential of human spirit. In other 
words, they see the uniqueness of every living thing as the fragile flowering of a singularity 
of experience that cannot be duplicated by law or logic. It is said that every living history and 
every living tradition is a universe onto itself, with its own «life world» of action, thought, habit 
and praxis. That’s why tradition is not something to escape from; it is something to engage 
and transform: «history is an enacted dramatic narrative in which the characters are also the 
authors» (MacIntyre 1981: 200).
For Nietzsche, the question was: which tradition, which morality, suits our heroic aspi-
rations best? Another variation of this theme is Alasdair MacIntyre’s answer to the older, 
Aristotelean-Platonic question: Wherein lies the good life of man? MacIntyre’s answer: in the 
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virtuous community of peers. Both of these approaches to community life raise the possibility 
of human freedom as engagement to tradition. Such a perspective says that true human free-
dom can only be experienced as the contented feeling of «having-made-a-choice», by way of 
subjective affirmation, and living these choices through to the end, to the bittersweet end, by 
flowing and moving through changing experiences like a fish swimming upstream, enjoying 
every minute of it, sticking to one’s principles and defending one’s friends with all the mad-
ness of the protagonist of Camus’s «Stranger» and all the self-intoxicating ecstatic fervour of 
a dancing Dervish.
Indeed — it is argued — the true slavery of human beings lies in the feelings of uproot-
edness and aimlessness, a condition where nothing great, beautiful, true or real can ever come 
about (according to anti-universalists) because nothing is neither required nor made possible 
when everything is permitted and nothing is categorically excluded at any given time. Such 
«tolerant multiculturalism» (so wonderfully analyzed by Slavoj Zizek) can lead to the total 
enslavement of the human being to a languid choicelessness and to an absolute, sickly prudence: 
avoiding the fear and disappointment of having made the wrong choice by refusing to make 
choices altogether, or only making weak choices. Such pragmatism that pushes one towards 
tolerant centrism has its charms, but the underside can be a failure of the individual to make 
great commitments to truth, value, beauty or any other kind of life project that pushes mean-
ing into the world.
Value nihilism, in the worst case, can enslave a human being to the sort of apathy that is 
well known to sociologists, culture critics and social workers. The answer to the challenges of 
post-modernism and multiculturalism, I think, is a reaffirmation of tradition from the perspec-
tive of absolute freedom. The trick is to make movement between traditions easy and painless, 
and indeed a skill taught in schools, similar to what is done in multicultural religious education 
today, giving children access to every belief system known to mankind, from the «official» to 
the most foreign: even (and especially) the ones that the school and the teacher disagree with. 
What we have left, after the absolutist claims or traditions are dispensed with and after the 
cosmopolitan teachings of Kant are duly digested, is a form of «cosmopolitan polytraditional-
ism» that recognizes the value of every tradition without succumbing to the universalism of 
either one of them. 
Such a neo-traditionalism permits the pure movement towards absolute freedom by the 
means of any and every tradition that we have access to, as mere tools to be used, and dispensed 
with, at will... We need to see cultures as labyrinths of truth, as specific forms of making some-
thing out of nothing, i.e. creating meaning into this world by an act of unjustifiable but almost 
heavenly fiat. By combining Herder and Kant (or Nietzsche and Aristotle), the enslaving effect 
of tradition can be thwarted by denying the validity of universalistic truth claims made by any 
one tradition, and instead affirming the totalizing power of human mind to move frictionlessly 
between experiences, traditions, cultures and allegiances. Such a power is multicultural in the 
best possible sense: not weak and feeble like modern politically correct multiculturalism, but 
rather susceptible to the logic of self-creation that every cultural identification supports and 
indeed makes possible. In recognizing the plurality of values inherent in the plurality of cultures 
(including cultures that only have one or two members, like private fantasies and boys’ clubs), 
we open the Pandora’s box of infinite marvels that is called the depth of the human subconcious, 
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and delve into the mysteries of parallel universes (because every culture is a world onto its 
own). We need to affirm the absolute value pluralism and the singularity of experience made 
possible by cultural diversity. Afterwards, we need to have some fun with it, like a cat with a 
mouse, playing around with reality itself.
The Nietzschean in us tells us to embrace a single vision and defend it «red in tooth and 
claw». but the Rortyan in us must also recognize the irony and contingency of any such value 
commitments. We need to engage traditions, but also to be ready to abandon them at the first 
instance, and even to mercilessly cross old battle lines, combine and confuse various traditions 
in unexpected ways and to do sacrilege to every sacred cow on our way. In other words, we 
need a Machiavellian pluralism: sincere but wickedly clever to boot. To sum up, every culture 
has its merits, yes, but there is nothing holy about it. Every culture, like every politics and 
every type of jazz, has its charm and every crime its own law and justification. I think that 
cultures are completely dumb creatures, and it is pointless to have them unless we can used 
and abuse them, brutally but in a fun way, like sex dolls, without mercy. After all, they have 
no soul, even if they give people one (or million). Cultures are not meant to be obeyed, but 
rather to be commanded and shaped at will.
2. PERFORMING CULTURE, OBEYING RULES
So, a culture is defined by the rules that make up the games that people engage in as part of a 
living tradition. To be a culture member, one needs to follow rules. Indeed, to the extent one 
follows rules (of habit, meaning, action, work, etc...) one is a more or less exemplary member 
of a community. To the extent a slave of an aristocrat forgoes his own democratic-universalist 
aspirations to achieve full citizenry, in order to serve wholeheartedly his master, to that same 
extent he is a seen as a «good slave» within the society of slave-owners. To the extent a Christian 
priest performs flawlessly the rites of the Eucharist, his parish will sleep easily that night. To 
the extent a bassist in a rock band performs his role in the timing of harmonies and tapping of 
melodies, to that extent he shall not fear the boot from the fickle but fair band leader. To the 
extent that a guest at a gala dinner dresses up to the code, even exceeding the norm, so do his 
chances of making friends and influencing people — or even finding a partner in love — improve 
in exact correlation. To the extent a biochemist relies on the theories of Crick and Watson, and 
not, say, on the Kabbalistic theories of Pico Della Mirandola, in explaining the reproductive 
potencies of the cell tissue he is cultivating, the infinitely greater his chances of getting published 
in Nature and in finding public funding for his research. 
Overall, the question of rule following is the question of fitting a pattern of mean-
ingful expectations within the parameters of established traditional bounds of cultural 
performativity.
With this in mind, tradition appears as a supraindividual imperative binding individual 
will to its ends. Performance of culture, in this limited sense, is only the conformism of will to 
external constraints. But this picture is not enough. It is simultaneously possible to understand 
culture as the attempted liberation of the human spirit from the bondage of matter, as the first 
stage of the complete liberation of human mind from the repetition compulsion of natural 
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cycles of birth, life and death. Culture, as we know, arises from the settlement of nomadic 
hunter-gatherer tribes to proto-agricultural and proto-urban cohabitations, which later develop 
further into the city states of the ancient world and the «cultures» proper that we know today. 
In this sense, any culture, be it Iranian theocracy or Spanish constitutional monarchy, provides, 
at the very least, the essential service of liberating human beings into the quality of higher-
order patterning that we call «state-ness» from the state of no-state that Hobbes, misleadingly 
enough, called the state of nature. 
Any culture is a kind of higher order reality principle building a bridge to heaven. Jacob’s 
ladder was a metaphor for the ascent of the spirit, but it could also be applied to describe the 
ascent of pattern out of chaos, as the self-disciplining drive that makes people say: «I have 
had enough of being bound to a way of being that is not my own, so let me do this and enslave 
myself to my own culture and tradition so that no-one can dictate the outlines of my prison for 
myself except myself! ...» 
So, culture is the self-liberating self-enslavement of mankind. The state of culture stands 
to the state of nature as the human mind stands to the human body: the essential extra that 
transforms and governs the latter by means of a transcendental superposition of hierarchies, 
lifting one’s consciousness from the lower realms to the higher, liberating thus the lower to 
the demands and purposes of the latter, in an act of free submission to a higher cause. This is 
an idea we need to reinvent: the idea of slavery as the first step of freedom (culture as the true 
liberation of nature)... or indeed, slavery as the end state of freedom (our compulsion to choose 
as the ultimate prison for mankind). After all, what do people mean by freedom? They mean the 
ability to choose something, to say something, to do something. And what is this something? 
It is something specific, something crazy, something that could have been otherwise. In other 
words, freedom is the freedom to choose/do/say/think/plan/want/desire/etc... one thing rather 
than another, i.e. one prison rather than another, to say «A but not B», or «B but not A», or 
any combination thereof. So, the demand for freedom is really the demand for a prison, for a 
way of doing things, for the final horizon and limits of one’s life. The Dasein closes in on its 
own horizon of truth. 
The idea of «identity» is born, as the guiding light of my life. For Nietzsche, any mode of 
self-assertion is an expression of the Will and vitality that goes into sustaining and maintaining 
the constitutive lie and violence that grounds the tradition by a continuous act of self-renewal 
and self-creation out of nothing. In Aristotelean/MacIntyrean terms, the freedom to belong to 
a tradition is the freedom to choose a virtuous life and stick by it, even if it means acting on 
principle against common sense and empirical evidence. And who am I to deny this right to 
people? Certainly it is a universal human imperative. After all, perhaps that is all we can do 
on this earth: choose one prison (prism) rather than another.
This is culture: it is slavery, imprisonment, stupidity, horror, evil itself... And, conse-
quently, freedom itself, liberation itself... Culture, like human life itself, is a way of living not 
some other way, but this very way. 
A tradition is the «free imprisonment» of mankind into patterns. Self-bondage; 
self-liberation.
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3. PERFORMING CULTURE... AND BREAKING RULES (EVEN WHILE BEING 
TRAPPED IN OUR PRISM/PRISON)
As we have seen, culture is a way of doing things, and this way of doing things (any way of 
doing things) constitutes a prison for the mind that also doubles as a free domain of action.
In such a perspective, what hope is there?
I claim that there’s double hope: 1) freedom within tradition, and 2) freedom without 
tradition.
The second answer, the second hope, is offered by existentialist and mystical traditions. 
The first hope is offered by the enlightened historical communitarian tradition of Vico 
and Herder.
It is this communitarian hope, combined with the truth of cosmopolitanism, that I embrace 
here, more than the existentialist answer — although, to be truthful, there is nothing in either 
existentialism or mysticism that I expressly disavow. No; the problem with existentialism is not 
that it is a doctrine of freedom; the problem with existentialism is that it’s not free enough: that 
it hasn’t given us the tools for embracing world views convincingly, only the means whereby 
we can destroy, deconstruct or transcend them. This is why my understanding of freedom is 
always «freedom within bounds» and not «freedom without tradition».
Let me be clear, here: I am not saying that freedom-without-compulsion, as such, is an 
illusion. I am saying something more radical than that — I’m saying that freedom is the way 
for bondage to appear in the world. How? To make a choice (A or B) is to deny reality its 
empirical richness (it’s quality of A and B). And yet to make a choice is to live, to become a 
human being. But if denying (the complete multifaceted nature of) reality is constitutive of 
making a choice, and if making a choice is constitutive of freedom, and, finally, if being free 
is constitutive of being human, then (transitively speaking) denying reality is constitutive of 
being human. We must, it seems, qua being human, make a commitment, freely, to a project 
of self-realization, and this project of self-making is a way of narrowing down reality to a 
specific pathway. To be free is to be selfish, subjective, perspectivally challenged and crazily 
infatuated with a lie called «way of being» or «method» (see also Feyerabend’s 1975 book, 
«Against Method») that overtakes one’s life as a modality that rolls over us with overbearing 
conviction because it holds us in its grip — whether because it conforms to empirical facts as 
we see them, or to our prevalent ideological outlines, or because it neatly disagrees with what 
our father and mother hold dear and thus constitutes a means of liberation for us.
But both without and within traditions, things are constantly changing. Time, as Heraclitus 
and Nietzsche agreed, is the master of even the most self-assured of fixed identities. Not only 
is every sign usage always differing from every other, but even within a particular culture and 
tradition, signs and events are always being reinterpreted so as to be in constant flux of self-
transcendence of their own history. But the point is not that every identity dissipates in the winds 
of time. The point is that tradition itself is change. Tradition is a kind of algebra for producing 
novelty and change. Tradition is a complex metamorphosis of reality, slowly unfolding in time. 
What is changing it? People, events, outside forces, but mostly the logic of the tradition itself: 
the logic that dictates how its future is left open-ended and how its narrative might continue, 
branch out, discontinue or take in new directions. Its narrative arc is underdetermined and open 
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to newness. In MacIntyre’s phrase, «[u]npredictability and telelogy therefore coexist as part of 
our lives [:] is always both the case that there are constraints on how the story [of a tradition 
and of our lives] can continue and that within those constraints there are indefinitely many 
ways that it can continue» (1981: 200).
In other words, a tradition, in the end, is like a prison whose outlines have not been 
drawn before the final act. This is where my «Machiavellian pluralism» comes into play: we 
must embrace traditions as the raw material for potential, conceivable futures, as the ground 
for radical change. Of course, traditions are nothing but ways of doing things, and limited 
ways at that. But to pick one is not to commit the pathetic fallacy of parochialism, at least 
if (and only if) the choice of so doing is, first of all, free, and second of all, made within the 
transcendental horizon of value pluralism and enlightened cosmopolitanism. To embrace a 
tradition self-reflexively means to have accepted the limitations (and liberations) of the tradi-
tion as the necessary enclosure and molding of the horizon of truth. Habermasian and Apelian 
policy of tolerance regarding conflicting communicative horizons should always be exercised 
to keep open gates of mutual transfer of world-constitutive semiotic insights (i.e. deep level 
communication between different traditions), and to facilitate inter-movement and peaceful 
coexistence at the borders of such (easily conflicting) traditions. Furthermore, the long-term 
goal should be an increased flow of information between cultures. This can apply to nation 
states, scientific disciplines, political ideological traditions as well as aesthetic and social life 
paradigms. Everywhere the key is to maintain a perspective of transcendental openness to 
radical novelty; to work within a tradition in order to subvert the tradition. In the end, our goal 
should be to subvert all traditions in the name of some as-of-yet unnamable utopian vision of 
world in harmony and peace.
So, to work within a tradition, within a culture, is not necessarily a crime against good 
faith and good conscience, if it is done kindly and tolerantly with some particular (achievable) 
goal in mind (that couldn’t be achieved without the help of the tradition), and also without 
compulsion, without resentment and without any foreboding regrets of not being free to do 
as one pleases. After making a commitment, things could be otherwise, but they would be 
otherwise only if that culture (or way of doing things) were abandoned, i.e. only if truth were 
again re-evaluated and reality overturned. In Alain Badiou’s words, the «Event» of the revo-
lution would overtake the «Being» of the old, established culture [see Alain Badiou (2005)]. 
But my point is that the «Event» is already taking place within the logic of the tradition itself. 
Tradition is the Event.
There are, in my mind, no better traditions and worse traditions, just like there are no 
better or worse animal species. Every species is a way of doing things. There are no better or 
worse cultures just like there are no better or worse letters of the alphabet. The framing of the 
question itself is absurd. The only objective measure of greatness of any tradition is the laxity 
of the conditions of entry and exit that it permits to its members; and, perhaps, the amount of 
violence and indoctrination that it utilizes against its children. But that is a complex matter 
that shall not be got into here. For our purposes, we shall verify the validity of every way of 
living as, potentially, the true and only way of living.
There are numerous traditions. They constitute history. Culture is the confluence of tradi-
tions plus the performative acts made in the present condition. We have to perform culture in 
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the present, because history is dead, and we are alive. So we cannot be only the sum total of 
different traditions. We also make traditions. We make traditions by accepting them, but also 
transforming them through a continuous process of reinterpretative semioethical praxis. This 
movement, essentially, becomes the exercise of the Machiavellian pluralistic principle, any-
thing goes; anything goes, that is, as long as it serves the ends of a particular line of argument 
or the teleological goal of a particular virtue we seek to perfect. So, we must play within the 
system in order to transform or subvert he system, i.e. in order to improve the system. This 
is what terrorists do, and also what serious academics do — not to mention the Picassos and 
Matisses of this world. 
Why is there an interrelationship between changing the system and improving it? Because 
movement as such, time as such, history as such, consciousness as such, demands the continual 
shift of the meaning of the fundamentals of any tradition. The so-called «central meaning» of 
Christianity, for example, has been continously shifting ever since Jesus uttered his first words 
of prophetic wisdom. St. Paul was a liar and a crook and consequently someone who understood 
the greatness of Jesus as the greatness of a tradition that can always be added to and improved 
upon. This is why St. Paul was a great and authentic Christian, a true disciple of Christ. St. 
Paul saved Christianity from Christ’s parochial obscurantism. In another example, we know 
that the concept of «mass» in science and physics has been continuously shifting throughout the 
centuries and millennia, from Aristotle to Einstein and Peter Higgs. A third example would be 
the changing representation of male nudity across the spectrum from Greco-Roman sculptures 
to the homoerotic pop art of Tom of Finland in the 20th Century; never at rest, always nude 
— and always new (in the wake of the old). 
Every tradition, then, is always changing. This is why traditions are the source of great 
freedom and liberation for the human being! To be an outstanding member of any tradition 
is truly, paradoxically, to be outside of it, to stand mockingly above it and to transcend the 
limitations of this tradition in a way that, in truth, approximates Machiavellian irony. To be a 
great sculptor (as opposed to a mediocre one) is to understand the rules that make it «happen» 
but also to shift the central thesis in that argument and to liberate the hand and the chisel from 
the dogmatic constraints of the past in an act of spiritual freedom that forces consensus reality 
into hiding out of sheer shock and awe. Such acts of self-assured mocking mastery (of form and 
tradition) constitute the organizing principles of great art, i.e. revolutionary art, i.e. traditional 
(canonical) art, and also of a great performance of tradition. Culture loves its skilful rule-break-
ers. A Goethe or a Shakespeare understood the logic and limitations of their native languages 
better than almost anyone, but their mastery of their language gave them the sufficient skill 
set to renew and change the very modus operandi of the language itself, and to change their 
contemporary culture, literary form and society in the process. An Einstein, Picasso, Wagner 
or Goethe is a perfect example of a traditionalist revolutionary. By understanding and skilfully 
breaking the rules of that tradition that nurtured them they became that tradition.
Tradition itself carries the inscriptions of all its revolutions (that it has seen and insti-
gated) as its open secret — on its sleeve, as it were, proudly enough. Saying: «I am tradition, 
I am change». I am Goethe.
To sum up, the rules of the game are meant to be broken, respecting the old via the new.
Historical consciousness is the key to achieving revolutionary potential.
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Why not see traditions as great opportunities? The momentum of history, with a bit of 
ingenuity and historical consciousness, can be on your side, behind you, supporting your every 
move, urging you on even as you proceed to destroy its dogmas through an act of semiotic 
reinterpretation. Anybody who has studied aikido knows the concept of using the momentum 
of the enemy to your advantage; this is how history should be tackled: gently, bringing her to 
her knees, until she comes to you begging for mercy.
4. LAST WORDS... FOR A NEW WORLD
Since we can never say the last word, about anything, let us at least say a few things about 
where we are now.
My paper has combined Kant and Herder into a cosmopolitan communitarianism.
I have advocated the combination of principles of enlightenment tolerance and value 
pluralism with a renewed acceptance of traditions as the sources of freedom available to human 
beings. This implies that no tradition has any special claim to truth (i.e. no tradition can claim 
to be universalizable in a violent way to the exclusion of other traditions), but also that every 
tradition has its specific claims that have to be judged by its own standards, not by the standards 
of anybody else (who claims privileged access to truth). The second principle is that people 
should have perfect ability to move between traditions, cultures, identities and belief systems 
without being punished for it (and in fact such transcendental, transhorizontal movement should 
be encouraged). The third principle, which ties together the first and the second, is that every 
culture needs to be judged only from the basis of value pluralism, but strictly indeed from this 
basis. Basically, this means that those traditions (and only those traditions) that threaten the 
ecospheric balance of a pluralistic world — which supports a multitude of cultures, traditions 
and habits — constitute a danger to any culture, and to the very idea of a pluralistic commu-
nitarian utopia, and need to be defended against (as universalizing viruses that seek the total 
destruction of the «biodiversity» of cultures).
Whether this means that every culture must ultimately be destroyed in order to save 
cultural pluralism, well, we shall have to wait and see... 
After all, isn’t every (local) tradition potentially (global) domination? Yes; in a way this 
is true. Every culture says: «I am that I am! I have the right to be, here and there and potentially 
everywhere!» This means that, in the end, to achieve novelty, we shall need to move beyond 
cultures as such, and to deny the truth of all (past) tradition, culture, history, truth, reality, 
significance and meaning, in order to start afresh. Traditions, for us, should be mere tools. We 
need to live anew.
After all, the past is the past. There is no need to go back to it. Time moves forward. 
There is only one «now» — and it is now. To move forward, we need to engage a tradition, 
understand it from within (Herder’s «Einfühlung» and Vico’s «fantasia») and follow its rules 
to the end, and then (only at the last minute, with all the conviction of a fanatic believer gone 
mad) to break them, creatively, performatively, truly and ingeniously, thus perfecting the chain 
that tradition has made. In other words, we need to know something old in order to say, cre-
ate or do anything new. We need to master the past in order to free ourselves from its elusive 
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grasp. Only then, after we learn the past thoroughly, after we situate ourselves in a tradition 
of our choosing, and after we become its rule-breaking rule-makers, can we really become a 
good Christian or a good scientist or a good Gothic writer or a good stripper, or anything else 
that remotely resembles freedom. 
So, to belong to a tradition as a way of being is a thing we can all agree upon is a worthy 
and unavoidable consequence of being human. Our lives are essentially organized mythologi-
cally, narratively. This is what Alasdair MacIntyre meant, in support for his communitarianism, 
when he said that «Vico was right and so was Joyce» (1981: 201). The narrative of our lives is 
an open-ended journey through cyclical time: riverrun, past Eve and Adam’s... Yet, to belong 
to which tradition, under what conditions, for what purpose, with what conditions of entry and 
exit, for what period of time — these are questions that everybody has to define for his — or 
herself, within the confines of a tradition, a past, a history and the living present. 
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